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Abstract
Previous behavioral studies have shown that initial ownership influences individuals’ fairness consideration and other-
regarding behavior. However, it is not entirely clear whether initial ownership influences the brain activity when a recipient
evaluates the fairness of asset distribution. In this study, we randomly assigned the bargaining property (monetary reward)
to either the allocator or the recipient in the ultimatum game and let participants of the study, acting as recipients, receive
either disadvantageous unequal, equal, or advantageous unequal offers from allocators while the event-related potentials
(ERPs) were recorded. Behavioral results showed that participants were more likely to reject disadvantageous unequal and
equal offers when they initially owned the property as compared to when they did not. The two types of unequal offers
evoked more negative going ERPs (the MFN) than the equal offers in an early time window and the differences were not
modulated by the initial ownership. In a late time window, however, the P300 responses to division schemes were affected
not only by the type of unequal offers but also by whom the property was initially assigned to. These findings suggest that
while the MFN may function as a general mechanism that evaluates whether the offer is consistent or inconsistent with the
equity rule, the P300 is sensitive to top-down controlled processes, into which factors related to the allocation of attentional
resources, including initial ownership and personal interests, come to play.
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Introduction
Individuals tend to value their own possessions more favorably
than those they do not own, a bias that has been termed as mere
ownership effect [1,2]. This effect occurs even when the actual
possessions are imaged, not physically present [3]. The ownership
effect has been linked to the self-enhancement motivation in which
individuals overvalue an object owned by or associated with self in
order to improve their self-image [1].
Recent studies suggested that the perception of ownership
modulates other-regarding behavior in economic decision-making
[4,5,6]. Oxoby and Spraggon [6] asked participants to play
a dictator game (DG; [7]) in which the allocator decided how to
distribute asset and the recipient had no right but to accept the
allocation. The asset (a certain amount of monetary reward) was
initially earned either by the allocator or by the recipient through
an unrelated task. Result showed that offers to the recipient were
lower in the ‘‘allocator-earned’’ condition and higher in the
‘‘recipient-earned’’ condition, highlighting the importance of
property right in determining individuals’ other-regarding behav-
ior [8]. Using a related task, Leliveld et al. [4] investigated how the
perception of ownership affects the allocator’s other-regarding
behavior in an ultimatum game (UG). This game, originally
developed by Gu ¨th et al. [9], is similar to the DG but has one
major difference: the recipient can either accept or reject the
allocator’s offer. If accepted, the pie is divided as proposed; if
rejected, both the allocator and the recipient end empty handed.
Leliveld et al. [4] put the chips (related to monetary reward later
on) either at the allocator’s side of the table or at the recipient’s
side of the table. Results showed that allocations to the recipient
were higher in the latter case than in the former case; moreover,
this modulation of other-regarding behavior by the perceptions of
ownership reflected a true concern for other’s welfare rather than
fear of rejection.
The ownership effect is closely related to the concept of
entitlement. Entitlement is a kind of feeling that may result from
ownership: because I feel I own it, I have a right to end up with it.
In the above studies, the allocators distributed more assets to
themselves when they had the initial ownership of the assets and
felt entitled to have more. It should be noted, however, that the
previous behavioral studies on the effect of ownership or
entitlement have exclusively focused on the allocator’s decision-
making behavior. It is not clear how the recipient’s fairness
consideration in economic bargain would be affected by the initial
ownership or the feeling of entitlement, and more close to the
purpose of the present study, whether and how the brain responses
to different levels of fairness in asset allocation are modulated by
the initial ownership.
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ownership of a bargaining property modulates recipient’s fairness
consideration; this was measured through behavioral reactions
(i.e., accepting vs. rejecting offers) and electrophysiological
recordings. We randomly assigned the property (a certain amount
of monetary reward) to either the allocator or the recipient before
the presentation of the division scheme and measured the
recipient’s event-related potentials (ERPs) evoked by the division
scheme. We manipulated the level of fairness in asset allocation by
letting the recipient receive disadvantageous unequal offers (1, 2,
or 3 out of 10 Chinese yuan), equal offers (5 out of 10 yuan) or
advantageous unequal offers (7 or 8 out of 10 yuan). Behaviorally,
we were interested in the acceptance rate for different offers. This
rate should decrease as the level of fairness in the division scheme
decreases. Importantly, this rate could be lower when the assets
were initially owned by the recipient than by the allocator,
especially when the offers were disadvantageously unequal. The
feeling of entitlement might lead the recipient to demand a larger
portion of the pie.
Electrophysiologically, we focused on MFN and P300, two ERP
components that are sensitive to the evaluation of fairness in asset
distribution. The medial frontal negativity (MFN) or the feedback-
related negativity (FRN) was originally observed in studies on
performance monitoring and the evaluation of decision outcome
[10,11,12,13]. The FRN is a negative deflection peaking between
200 ms and 350 ms at frontocentral recording sites, and is more
pronounced for negative feedback associated with unfavorable
outcomes, such as incorrect responses or monetary loss, than for
positive feedback. Later studies showed that these differential
responses to decision outcome can be modulated by social factors,
such as interpersonal relationship between the evaluator and the
decision maker [14,15,16,17,18,19,20] and the extent of personal
responsibility for the outcome [21,22]. These studies suggest the
FRN may reflect the processes of assessing the motivational/
affective impact of the outcome events (i.e., the processes of
putting subjective values onto the outcomes; [10,23]. Importantly,
recent studies extended the role of FRN in outcome evaluation
and performance monitoring to the social domain and to the
online decision process and found that violations of social norms,
such as unfair or unequal offers in asset division, also elicit more
negative-going FRN (or MFN) than fair offers [24,25,26,27,28]. In
such studies, participants were offered either fair (e.g., receiving
50%) or unfair (e.g., receiving 10%) divisions of assets (monetary
reward) and ERPs were time-locked to the presentation of such
division schemes. Although participants were not directly provided
with feedback contingent upon their actions or choices, a division
scheme may nevertheless be compared with implicit, long-
established social norms (e.g., equal division) concerning asset
distribution and the scheme’s motivational/affective significance is
hence derived. Any violation of the norms would elicit the MFN
(FRN) responses. A study showed that individuals highly
appreciating moral norms such as fairness and honesty exhibited
larger MFN amplitudes when processing unfair offers than
individuals with less regard for such norms [24].
For the present design, we predicted a more negative-going
MFN for the disadvantageous unequal offers, as compared to the
equal offers. The situation for the advantageous unequal offers
could be more complex. If the MFN reflects the violation of
expectancy at some abstract level, then the advantageous unequal
offers should elicit a more negative-going MFN, similar to the
disadvantageous unequal offers. If the MFN reflects simply the
valence of offers or the relevance of offers to self-interests, then we
should predict a less negative-going MFN for the advantageous
unequal offers, as compared to the equal offers. Oliveira et al. [29]
found that both unexpected positive reward and unexpected
negative reward elicited more negative-going FRN responses than
expected feedback in an anticipation-timing task and that the two
FRN effects were of equal magnitudes, consistent with the first
possibility outlined above.
More importantly, we predicted that the initial ownership may
modulate the MFN effects for the disadvantageous and advanta-
geous unequal offers. Previous behavioral studies have already
shown that people’s fairness consideration is influenced by various
social factors, such as the valence (gain vs. loss) of a bargaining
property [30,31], the power of those involved in the transaction
[32] and the context in which a division scheme is presented
[33,34]. We also conducted an ERP study asking participants to
act as recipients in DG and received either equal or disadvanta-
geous unequal offers from friends or strangers [27]. The MFN
effect for disadvantageous unequal offers was present only in the
friend-allocation condition, not in the stranger-allocation condi-
tion. In the present design, the (dis-)advantageous unequal offers
could elicit stronger MFN effects when the bargaining property
was initially owned by the recipients rather than by the allocators,
as the feeling of entitlement could enhance the recipients’
expectancy towards an equal or larger portion of the pie.
Another ERP component, the P300, which is the most positive
peak in the period of 200–600 ms post-onset of feedback and
which typically increases in magnitude from frontal to parietal
electrodes, has also been found to be related to various aspects of
outcome evaluation. Earlier studies employing the oddball
paradigm suggested that the P300 is related to higher-order
cognitive operations, such as memory updating, selective attention
and resource allocation [35]. The P300 has also been found to be
related to various aspects of outcome evaluation. Some studies
found that the P300 is sensitive to the magnitude of reward, with
a more positive response to a larger than to a smaller reward
[13,36]. Other studies suggested that the P300 is also sensitive to
reward valence, with a more positive amplitude for positive
feedback than for negative outcome [18,37,38,39,40]. It is possible
that during outcome evaluation more attentional resources have
been devoted to the outcome magnitude or valence that has
stronger motivational significance to the participants. In asset
distribution, Wu and colleagues found that the P300 is more
positive to fair offers than to disadvantageous unfair offers,
suggesting that differential distribution of attentional resources to
the two types of offers which had different affective/motivational
significance [27]. We hence predicted to observe the same pattern
on the P300 for the two types of offers. For advantageous unequal
offers, one would normally predict an even more positive P300 as
the P300 has been found to increase with the magnitude of reward
[13,36].
It was not clear, however, whether and how the P300 would be
modulated by initial ownership. Turk et al. [41] observed a more
positive P300 to an object when it was assigned to the participant
rather than to another person. The authors interpreted this effect
as reflecting increased attention to the self-relevant objects. In the
present design, however it was not clear how this initial ownership
would affect the P300 responses to the later division schemes.
Methods
Participants
Thirty undergraduate and graduate students (11 females) were
recruited from the University intranet. The mean age of the
participants was 21.6 years, ranging between 19 and 25 years.
They were paid 30 Chinese yuan (about $ 4.5) as basic payment
and were informed that additional monetary rewards would be
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the participants were paid 20 yuan extra on top of the basic
payment. Four graduate students (2 females), who were strangers
to the EEG participants, were recruited as confederates. The
purpose of using four confederates was to reduce reputation
building in the repeated-trial game and to make the experimental
setup more realistic since the EEG participant would play against
different allocators in rounds of the game.
All the participants were right-handed and had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision. They self-reported on a short ques-
tionnaire no history of neurological or psychiatric disorders.
Informed consent was obtained from each participant before the
test. The experiment was carried out in accordance with the
Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the Ethics
Committee of the Department of Psychology, Peking University.
Design and procedures
The experiment had a 362 within-participant factorial design,
with the first factor referring to the offer type (disadvantageous
unequal vs. equal vs. advantageous unequal offer) and the second
factor referring to the initial ownership (self vs. other). Disadvan-
tageous unequal offers could be 1, 2, or 3 yuan (out of 10 yuan),
equal offers could be 5 yuan (out of 10 yuan), and advantageous
unequal offers could be 7 or 8 yuan (out of 10 yuan). The
bargaining property (10 yuan) was assigned ostensibly by the
computer to either the recipient or the allocator in random order
before the division scheme was presented to the recipient.
When the EEG participant came to the laboratory, he/she and
the four confederates were told that they would sit in separate
rooms to finish a task together through the computer network. The
EEG participant was ostensibly selected through lottery to
undergo the EEG test. This participant was then told that he/
she would play as a recipient in UG and the others would be
allocators. He/she was also informed about the rules of UG and
the manipulation of ownership. That is, at the beginning of each
round the computer would randomly assign 10 yuan to either the
allocator or himself/herself, and the allocator would then offer
a scheme on how to divide the amount. The EEG participant was
asked to press a button with the index finger of his/her left or right
hand, without elaborative thinking, to indicate whether he/she
would accept or reject the offer. He/she was reminded that the
allocators made their division schemes individually and indepen-
dently, and his/her response would not be sent back to the
allocator immediately and therefore could not affect the allocators’
offers in following rounds.
Each trial began with the presentation of a fixation sign (a white
dot subtended 0.3? of visual angle) for 500 ms against a black
background (see Fig. 1). The sentence ‘‘The computer is randomly
pairing’’ in Chinese (white and Song font, size 32) was presented
for either 800, 850, 900, 950, or 1000 ms, indicating to the EEG
participant that one of the other four persons was randomly
selected to play as an allocator in the current round of game. Then
the EEG participant’s own head portrait and a silhouette (each
subtended 1.561.6u, separated for 2.3u between the centers of the
two figures) were presented at the left side of the screen for either
800, 900, 1000, 1100 or 1200 ms, along with Chinese words
‘‘please wait’’ (white and Song font, size 32) at the left. This was to
suggest to the participant that the computer was assigning the
initial ownership of the 10 yuan. The positions of these two figures
were counterbalanced over trials. After this frame, the assignment
of initial ownership, with a photo of a 10 yuan bill (2.6u 61.3u)
aligned with either of the figures, was presented for 1500 ms. It
was explained to the participant that the computer had endowed
the money initially to the person involved. After the presentation
of a blank screen for a jittered time between 500 and 800 ms, the
allocator’s division scheme, in two lines of words (e.g., ‘‘he 8, you
2’’, white and Song font, size 32) was revealed at the center of
screen for 1200 ms. The screen turned blank again for 500 ms,
followed by the presentation of two options, ‘‘accept’’ and ‘‘reject’’,
on the left and right side of the screen, with the positions of the two
options counterbalanced over participants. The EEG participant
was asked to make the ‘‘accept’’ or ‘‘reject’’ decision as quickly as
possible and the next trial began after 1000 ms after the button
press.
The participant was seated comfortably about 1.5 m in front of
a computer screen in a dimly lit room. The experiment was
administered on a computer with a Del 22-in. CRT display, using
Presentation software (Neurobehavioral System Inc.) to control the
presentation and timing of the stimuli. The experiment consisted
of 4 blocks of 75 trials each. Under each of the two types of initial
ownership, the disadvantageous unequal condition consisted of 20
trials of 1/9 offer, 20 trials of 2/8 offer and 10 trials of 3/7 offer;
the equal condition consisted of 40 trials of 5/5 offer; and the
advantageous unequal condition consisted of 20 trials of 7/3 offer
and 20 trials of 8/2 offer. In addition, 10 trials of 4/6 offer and
another 10 trials of 6/4 offer were used as fillers. The number
before the slash indicated the offered amount to the recipient and
the number after the slash indicated the amount left to the
allocator. Without the participant’s knowledge, all the offers were
predetermined by a computer program. The 300 trials were
pseudo-randomized with the restriction that no more than 3
consecutive trials were of the same offer type and no more than 3
consecutive trials were of the same initial ownership.
A practice block of 20 trials was administered before the formal
test. To check the manipulation of initial ownership, we presented
the participants, after the experiment, with the fourth frame of
Fig. 1. and asked them to indicate on a 7-point Likert Scale to
what extent they felt that the property should be in their own
possession (1= absolutely not in their own possession, 7=
absolutely in their own possession) and to what extent they felt
that the property should be in the allocator’s possession (1=
absolutely not in the allocator’s possession, 7= absolutely in the
allocator’s possession) in each initial ownership condition. We also
presented the participants with the fourth frame of Fig. 1 and
asked the participants to indicate the minimal amount (out of 10
yuan) they wanted from the pie and the fairest division they
perceived when the property was assigned to themselves or to the
allocator. The participants were debriefed, paid and thanked at
the end of the experiment.
EEG Recording and Analysis
EEGs were recorded from 64 scalp sites using tin electrodes
mounted in an elastic cap (Brain Products, Munich, Germany)
according to the international 10–20 system. The vertical
electrooculogram (VEOGs) was recorded supra-orbitally from
the right eye. The horizontal EOG (HEOG) was recorded from
electrodes placed at the outer canthus of the left eye. All EEGs and
EOGs were referenced online to an external electrode which was
placed on the tip of nose and were re-referenced offline to the
mean of the left and right mastoids. Electrode impedance was kept
below 5 kV for EOG channels and for all other electrodes. The
bio-signals were amplified with a band-pass from 0.016 to 100 Hz
and digitized on-line with a sampling frequency of 500 Hz.
Separate EEG epochs of 1000 ms (with a 200-ms pre-stimulus
baseline) were extracted offline, time-locked to the onset of each
division scheme. Ocular artifacts were corrected with an eye-
movement correction algorithm which employs a regression
analysis in combination with artifact averaging [42]. Epochs were
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activity of that channel during the baseline period. All trails in
which EEG voltages exceeded a threshold of 680 mV during
recording were excluded from further analysis. The EEG data
were filtered with a band-pass from 0.016 to 30 Hz.
We focused on 10 frontocentral electrodes, FC3, FC1, FCz,
FC2, FC4, C3, C1, Cz, C2 and C4 for the MFN responses and 10
centro-posterior electrodes, CP3, CP1, CPz, CP2, CP4, P3, P1,
Pz, P2 and P4, for the P300 responses since the MFN and the
P300 effects tended to be the strongest on these electrodes. Based
on the visual inspection of ERP waveforms, we used the mean
amplitudes in the 280–380 ms time window for the MFN
measurement and the mean amplitudes in the 400–600 ms time
window for the P300 measurement (see also [28] for similar
treatment). Average amplitudes over frontocentral and centro-
posterior electrodes were used in the following analysis. Analyses
of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted with two within-partici-
pant factors: initial ownership (self vs. other) and offer type
(disadvantageous unequal vs. equal vs. advantageous unequal
offer). The Greenhouse-Geisser correction for violation of the
assumption of sphericity was applied where appropriate. The
Bonferroni correction was used for multiple comparisons.
Results
Among the thirty EEG participants, three participants stated
that they completely disbelieved the setup of the experiment in the
interview after the EEG test, four participants displayed excessive
artifacts in EEG recording, one participant misunderstood the
game rule, and one participant accepted all the offer types. These
participants were excluded from data analysis, leaving twenty-one
participants (8 females) for the following analysis.
Manipulation Checks of Initial Ownership
The post-experiment questionnaire indicated that the incidental
assignment of the 10 yuan bill in line with either the participant’s
head portrait or the other’s silhouette strongly affected the
participants’ perception of potential ownership. A 2 (location of
the 10 yuan bill: the recipient’s head portrait vs. the other’s
silhouette) 6 2 (benefactor of allocation: allocator vs. recipient)
repeated measures ANOVA on the perceived ownership showed
a significant interaction between the two factors, F(1, 20)=56.88,
p,0.001. Simple-effect tests revealed that when the 10 yuan bill
was temporarily located in line with the participant’s own portrait,
participants thought that the property should be more in their own
Figure 1. Sequence of events in a single trial.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039627.g001
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possession (2.9060.25), p,0.001. On the other hand, the
participant perceived the property to be more in the allocator’s
possession (5.1460.29) than in their own (3.1460.32), p,0.01,
when the 10 yuan bill was located in line with the other’s
silhouette.
The manipulation of initial ownership also influenced the
participants’ self-reported minimal acceptance amount out of 10
yuan. The minimal acceptance amount was significantly higher
when the property was initially endowed to the participant
(4.8660.33) than when the bill was initially endowed to the
allocator (2.8660.33), p,0.001. Moreover, the participants in-
dicated that the fairest offer for themselves was 6.4860.25 yuan
(out of 10 yuan) when the property was initially endowed to the
participant, which was significantly higher than the amount when
the bill was initially endowed to the allocator (4.6760.26),
p,0.001. These results indicate that the perceived fairness in
asset allocation changes according to the initial ownership or the
feeling of entitlement.
Behavioral Results
The acceptance rates for different division schemes are
presented in Fig. 2. A 2 (initial ownership: self vs. other) 6 3
(offer type: disadvantageous unequal vs. equal vs. advantageous
unequal offer) repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant
main effect of offer type, F(2, 40)=108.31, p,0.001, indicating
that the acceptance rate for disadvantageous unequal offers
(0.2460.05) was lower than for either equal (0.9160.03) or
advantageous unequal offers (0.9460.03), as confirmed by the
post-hoc tests (p,0.001). The differences between the equal and
the advantageous unequal offer conditions were not significant
(p.0.1). The main effect of initial ownership was also significant,
F(1, 20)=12.24, p,0.01, suggesting that the acceptance rate was
higher when the 10 yuan bill was initially aligned with the other’s
silhouette (0.7660.02) than when bill was presented with the
participant’s own portrait (0.6360.03). Importantly, the interac-
tion between initial ownership and offer type was significant, F(2,
40)=7.25, p,0.01. Simple-effect tests showed that the acceptance
rate to disadvantageous unequal offers was significantly higher in
the ‘‘other’’ condition (0.3660.07) than in the ‘‘self’’ condition
(0.1160.04), t(20)=3.81, p,0.01. A similar pattern was observed
for equal offers (0.9960.003 vs. 0.8360.06), t(20)=2.59, p,0.05.
However, this effect was absent for advantageous unequal offers,
t(20)=–0.70, p.0.1.
ERP Responses to the Presentation of Division Schemes
For the mean amplitudes in the 280–380 ms (MFN) time
window (Fig. 3A and 3B), a 2 (initial ownership: self vs. other)63
(offer type: disadvantageous unequal vs. equal vs. advantageous
unequal offer) repeated-measures ANOVA showed a significant
main effect of offer type, F(2, 40)=8.66, p,0.01, indicating that
ERP responses were more negative-going for disadvantageous
(22.06 mV) and advantageous unequal offers (22.72 mV) than for
equal offers (21.19 mV), p=0.06 and p,0.01, respectively. The
ERP responses to the two types of unequal offers did not differ,
p.0.1. However, we found no significant main effect of initial
ownership, F(1, 20)=0.18, p.0.1, nor the interaction between
initial ownership and offer type, F(2, 40)=1.13, p.0.1.
Similarly, for the mean amplitudes in the 400–600 ms (P300)
time window (Fig. 3A and 3C), the 2 63 ANOVA showed also
a main effect of offer type, F(2, 40)=32.98, p,0.001, indicating
that the mean amplitudes were more positive for equal offers
(4.36 mV) than for disadvantageous unequal offers (0.94 mV) or
advantageous unequal offers (0.12 mV). The differences between
conditions were all significant after Bonferroni correction,
p,0.001 or p,0.01. The main effect of initial ownership was
also significant, F(1, 20)=8.28, p,0.01, suggesting that the ERP
responses were more positive for the ‘‘other’’ (2.12 mV) than for
the ‘‘self’’ condition (1.49 mV). The interaction between offer type
and initial ownership did not reach significance, F(2,40)=0.54,
p.0.1, indicating that the initial ownership effect on the P300 was
essentially the same across the three types of offers.
Discussion
This study demonstrated that initial ownership influenced
recipients’ brain responses to unfair asset allocation schemes and
their behavioral decisions to accept offers. Participants were more
reluctant to accept disadvantageous unequal and equal offers
when the bargaining property was initially in their own possession
than when it was in the other’s possession, and this distinction
disappeared for advantageous unequal offers. Electrophysiologi-
cally, both disadvantageous and advantageous unequal offers
elicited more negative going ERP responses compared to equal
offers in an earlier, MFN time window (280–380 ms), with no
obvious differences between the two types of unequal offers. These
earlier effects were not affected by the initial ownership. In a later
time window (400–600 ms), however, the P300 was more positive
for equal offers than for disadvantageous unequal or advantageous
unequal offers and were more positive when the bargaining
property was initially owned by the allocator than by the recipient.
In the following paragraphs, we explore the implications of our
behavioral and electrophysiological findings, focusing on the
effects of fairness in asset allocation and the effects of initial
ownership.
Previous studies have shown that noncausal forms of association
between an individual and an object (e.g., the numbers
corresponding to an individual’s birthday, prior touch or use of
the object) can significantly increase the individual’s preference or
valuation of the object [43,44,45,46]. In this study, the initial
random assignment of the 10 yuan bill strongly affected the
participants’ perception of ownership and the feeling of entitle-
ment in subsequent asset distribution, as demonstrated by their
post-experiment self-report. Although the participants had been
explicitly told that the initial assignment was randomly conducted
by computer and it did not imply that they would eventually have
the money, this perception of ownership and feeling of entitlement
had nevertheless affected the participants’ subsequent acceptance
or rejection of disadvantageously unfair and even fair (equal)
offers.
One of the prominent motivations for individuals rejecting
disadvantageous unequal offers in asset distribution is to preserve
self-image/self-esteem and/or to punish unfair behavior [47,48].
The assignment of initial ownership to a participant may increase
his feeling of entitlement, and disadvantageous unequal divisions
and even equal divisions would be perceived as challenges to his/
her self-image or self-esteem. These challenges would then meet
strong reactions, resulting in lower acceptance rates. Thus, the
perceived fairness or equity in asset distribution can be highly
context-dependent [33,34].
On the other hand, the high acceptance rate and the absence of
initial ownership effect for advantageous unequal offers can also be
taken as evidence for the context-dependent nature of fairness
consideration. Although individuals care for fairness in asset
distribution, particularly when they are in a disadvantageous
position [30,31], they are nevertheless self-interested. This care for
self-interests may be strategic and is shown when their self-interests
are not likely to be negated. In this situation, effects of other social
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shadowed.
The finding of an MFN effect, with more negative going
responses to disadvantageous unequal offers than to equal offers,
replicated previous studies [24,25,26,27,28]. This effect may
reflect the detection of social expectancy violation as egalitarian
distribution of assets is an expected social norm in our life
[49,50,51]. The human brain might have developed specific
mechanisms to detect ongoing deviation from social norms [52]
and these mechanisms might be based on similar neural substrates
as those engaged in detecting errors during non-social reinforce-
ment leaning [53]. For instance, a recent fMRI study on social
conformity in facial attractiveness judgment showed that conflict
with group opinions, regardless of whether the opinions were given
by human peers or by computers, triggered activation of brain
regions implicated in reinforcement learning, i.e., rostral cingulate
zone and the ventral striatum, and these neural signals can predict
whether the participants would subsequently change their initial
judgment [54].
Importantly, we found that the advantageous unequal offers also
elicited more negative-going MFN responses than equal offers,
and this effect appeared to be of equal magnitude as for
disadvantageous unequal offers. This finding is novel and
important because it allows us to differentiate theoretical proposals
concerning the nature of MFN or FRN (assuming they are
essential the same, as we argued in the Introduction). One
proposal is that the FRN reflects the impact of midbrain dopamine
signals on the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) [11,55]. The phasic
decreases in dopamine inputs elicited by negative prediction errors
(i.e., ‘‘the result is worse than expected’’) give rise to the increased
ACC (anterior cingulate cortex) activity that is reflected as larger
MFN amplitude, whereas the phasic increases in dopamine signals
elicited by positive prediction errors (i.e., ‘‘the result is better than
expected’’) give rise to decreased ACC activity that is reflected as
smaller MFN amplitudes. By this account, we should expect to
observe less negative (or more positive) going MFN responses to
advantageous unequal offers than to equal offers. Another more
viable conception is that the FRN (the associated ACC) serves as
a general performance monitoring system which detects violation
of (social and non-social) expectancy, irrespective of whether the
violated expectancy is positive or negative [29,39,56]. By this
account, although the advantageous unequal offers could benefit
the recipients (i.e., better than expected), they nevertheless violated
the equity rule in asset distribution [57,58], just as the
disadvantageous unequal offers. Thus any division schemes in
violation of the equity rule would be detected by the monitoring
system, resulting in more negative-going MFN responses (see also
[29,39,56]). Indeed, recent studies suggest that the short-latency
phasic responses in the dopamine system are related to a general
process of switching attention to unexpected, behaviorally relevant
stimuli [59]. The feedback, whether positive or negative, elicits
a phasic increase in the activity of mesencephalic dopamine
neurons which, in turn, induces increased excitability in the ACC,
thereby giving rise to the FRN/MFN effect.
A perhaps surprising finding in this study was that the initial
ownership of the distributed asset had no obvious effect on the
MFN responses to division schemes. This absence of an initial
ownership effect appears to be at odds with Wu et al. [27] in which
the social distance between the recipient and the allocator (being
a friend or a stranger) modulated the MFN responses to fair and
disadvantageous unfair offers. We believe that the discrepancy
between the two studies may be related to paradigms adopted for
the experiments. Wu et al. [27] used a DG task in which the
recipient had no choice but to accept any offers given by the
allocator. However, in the UG task used here, the recipient could
choose either to accept or to reject offers. Thus the outcome to the
recipient was deterministic in DG and was negotiable in UG. This
difference in the certainty of outcome may affect the level of
affective/motivation significance assessment for the offers, as
deeper or more comprehensive assessment in DG allows social/
affective factors to play a bigger role. In UG, however, the system
may adopt a ‘‘wait-and-see’’ strategy and conduct deeper
assessment of offers only at a later stage involving more top-down
Figure 2. The acceptance rate in the ultimatum game as a function of the offer type. Error bars represent standard errors of the means.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039627.g002
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ownership (see later discussion).
Note that the assignment of bargaining property to the
participant may enhance their demand for a larger portion of
the pie, evidenced by the reduced acceptance rate for the equal
division in the ‘‘self’’ condition than in the ‘‘other’’ condition. One
might view this enhanced demand for the pie in self-ownership as
a kind of social norm. Consequently if the MFN reflects the
violation of social norm, we should expect to observe more
negative-going MFN responses to the disadvantageous offers in the
‘‘self’’ condition than in the ‘‘other’’ condition. Although we did
obtained numerically larger MFN responses for the former
(22.21 mV) than for the latter (21.92 mV), the difference between
the two conditions did not reach statistical significance. It is
possible that when different social norms are involved in
evaluating schemes of asset division, the equity rule, which is
Figure 3. ERP responses and topographic maps. (A) ERP responses time-locked to the onset of different offers at the midline FCz, Cz and Pz.
The shaded 280–380 ms time window was for the calculation of the mean amplitudes of the MFN. The shaded 400–600 ms time window was for the
calculation of the mean amplitudes of the P300. (B) Topographic maps for the MFN effects in the 280–380 ms time window. (C) Topographic maps
for the P300 effects in the 400–600 ms time window.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039627.g003
Initial Ownership and Fairness Consideration
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 June 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 6 | e39627ubiquitous in the society, might dominate over other rules,
including the rule for a larger portion of pie in self-ownership, in
determining the MFN responses. Further studies are needed to
investigate how different social norms or rules might interact to
modulate the brain activity in outcome evaluation or interpersonal
interaction.
In contrast to the MFN, we found that the P300 was modulated
by both the offer type and the initial ownership, although these
modulations were independent from each other. Previous studies
on outcome evaluation have indicated that the P300 is related to
processes of attentional allocation [62,63] and/or high-level
motivational/affective evaluation [13,64]. According to the equity
theory [57,58], individuals who are facing inequity would feel
distressed and are less satisfied with asset distribution than
individuals who are facing equity. The stronger P300 responses
to equal offers than to unequal offers may suggest that participants
(recipients of asset distribution) in this study attached more
motivational/affective significance to the equal divisions than to
unequal divisions, consistent with the social fairness norms
cultured in individuals.
In addition, we found that disadvantageous unequal offers
elicited more positive P300 than advantageous unequal offers.
Although both types of offers violate the equity rule of social
norms, it is possible that different amount of attentional resources
are used to process the two types of offers. For disadvantageous
unequal offers, participants might be in a difficult position to assess
the pros and cons of accepting or rejecting offers; for advantageous
unequal offers, participants might not have such dilemma and they
can assess the implications of offers, as demonstrated by their 94%
acceptance rate.
On the other hand, we observed a small, but significant initial
ownership effect on the P300, with the offers from the bargaining
property initially owned by allocator eliciting more positive P300
responses than the offers from the property initially owned by the
recipient himself/herself. A number of studies on outcome
evaluation have shown that the P300 is sensitive to reward
valence in gambling tasks, with positive outcomes eliciting more
positive P300 than negative outcomes [18,37,38,39,40]. In the
present study, any amount proposed by the allocator in the
‘‘other’’ condition might be considered, implicitly, as a kind of
extra ‘‘gain’’, even though the recipient may eventually decide to
reject the offer and lose it. Conversely, any amount proposed by
the allocator in the ‘‘self’’ condition might be considered as a kind
of ‘‘loss’’ as the bargaining property was initially assigned to the
recipient and he/she might implicitly declare the ownership of the
whole lot (see also [65]).
An important finding here was that the modulations of the P300
by offer type and initial ownership appeared to be independent
from each other, consistent with the absence of an interaction
between fairness of offers and social distance between the allocator
and recipient in DG [27]. We would like to suggest that there are
two top-down processes associated with the P300. One process
cares for fairness of different offers, with different levels of
attentional resources being devoted to the elaborative processing
of the social/affective significance of offers. Another process cares
more for self-interests and is sensitive to gain/loss. Either of two
processes can modulate the P300 magnitude, although it needs
further investigation to elucidate under what circumstances the
two processes work independently when they are manipulated
concurrently.
In summary, by assigning a bargaining property to either the
allocator or the recipient and presenting the recipient with offers of
different fairness levels, we found that the participant, acting as the
recipient, were more likely to reject disadvantageous unequal and
equal offers when they initially owned the property than when
they did not. The two types of unequal offers evoked more
negative-going MFN than the equal offers in an early time window
(280–380 ms) and these differential effects were not modulated by
the initial ownership. In a late time window (400–600 ms),
however, the P300 responses to division schemes were affected not
only by offer types but also by whom the property was initially
assigned to. These findings suggest that while the MFN may
function as a general mechanism that evaluates whether the offer is
consistent or inconsistent with the equity rule, the P300 is sensitive
to later, top-down controlled processes, into which factors related
to the allocation of attentional resources, including initial owner-
ship and personal interests, come to play.
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